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Abstract
Replicated services are inherently vulnerable to failures and security breaches. In a long-running
system, it is, therefore, indispensable to maintain a reconfiguration mechanism that would replace
faulty replicas with correct ones. An important challenge is to enable reconfiguration without
affecting the availability and consistency of the replicated data: the clients should be able to get
correct service even when the set of service replicas is being updated.
In this paper, we address the problem of reconfiguration in the presence of Byzantine failures:
faulty replicas or clients may arbitrarily deviate from their expected behavior. We describe a
generic technique for building asynchronous and Byzantine fault-tolerant reconfigurable objects:
clients can manipulate the object data and issue reconfiguration calls without reaching consensus
on the current configuration. Our solution makes sure that superseded and possibly compromised
configurations are harmless, that slow clients cannot be fooled into reading stale data, and that
Byzantine clients cannot cause a denial of service by affluent reconfiguration calls. Our approach is
modular and based on dynamic lattice agreement abstraction, and we discuss how to extend it to
enable Byzantine-fault-tolerant implementations of a large class of reconfigurable replicated services.
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1 Introduction
Replication and quorums. Replication is a natural way to ensure availability of shared
data in the presence of failures. A collection of replicas, each holding a version of the data,
ensure that the clients get a desired service, even when some replicas become unavailable or
hacked by a malicious adversary. Consistency of the provided service requires the replicas
to synchronize: intuitively, every client should be able to operate on the most “up-to-date”
data, regardless of the set of replicas it can reach.
It always makes sense to assume as little as possible about the environment in which
a system we design is expected to run. For example, asynchronous distributed systems
do not rely on timing assumptions, which makes them extremely robust with respect to
communication disruptions and computational delays. It is, however, notoriously difficult
and sometimes even impossible to make such systems fault-tolerant. The folklore CAP
theorem [11, 20] states that no replicated service can combine consistency, availability, and
partition-tolerance. In particular, no consistent and available read-write storage can be
implemented in the presence of partitions: clients in one partition are unable to keep track
of the updates taking place in another one.
Therefore, fault-tolerant storage systems tend to assume that partitions are excluded,
e.g., by requiring a majority of replicas to be correct [6]. More generally, one can assume a
quorum system, e.g., a set of subsets of replicas satisfying the intersection and availability
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properties [19]. Every (read or write) request from a client should be accepted by a quorum
of replicas. As every two quorums have at least one replica in common, intuitively, no client
can miss previously written data.
Of course, failures of replicas may jeopardize the underlying quorum system. In particular,
we may find ourselves in a system in which no quorum is available and, thus, no operation
may be able to terminate. Even worse, if the replicas are subject to Byzantine failures, we
may not be able to guarantee the very correctness of read values.
Asynchronous reconfiguration. To anticipate such scenarios in a long run, we must
maintain a reconfiguration mechanism that enables replacing compromised replicas with
correct ones and update the corresponding quorum assumptions. A challenge here is to find an
asynchronous implementation of reconfiguration in a system where both clients and replicas
are subject to Byzantine failures that can be manifested by arbitrary and even malicious
behavior. In the world of selfishly driven blockchain users, a reconfiguration mechanism must
be prepared to this.
Recently, a number of reconfigurable systems were proposed for asynchronous crash-
fault environments [2, 18, 22, 3, 32, 25] that were originally applied to (read-write) storage
systems [2, 18, 3], and then extended to max-registers [22, 32] and more general lattice data
type [25].
These proposals tend to ensure that the clients reach a form of “loose” agreement on the
currently active configurations, which can be naturally expressed via the lattice agreement
abstraction [8, 15]. We allow clients to (temporarily) live in different worlds, as long as these
worlds are “properly ordered”. For example, we may represent a configuration as a set of
updates (additions and removals of replicas) and require that all “installed” configurations
should be related by containment. A configuration becomes stale as soon as it is “subsumed”
by a new one representing a proper superset of updates.
Challenges of Byzantine fault-tolerant reconfiguration. In this paper, we focus on
Byzantine fault-tolerant reconfiguration mechanism. We had to address here several challenges,
specific to dynamic systems with Byzantine faults, which make them hard to benefit from
existing crash fault-tolerant reconfigurable solutions.
First, when we build a system out of lower-level components, we need to make sure
that the outputs provided by these components are “authentic”. Whenever a (potentially
Byzantine) process claims to have obtained a value v (e.g., a new configuration estimate)
from an underlying object (e.g., Lattice Agreement), it should also provide a proof σ that
can be independently verified by every correct process. The proof typically consists in a
multi-signature provided by a quorum of replicas of some configuration. We abstract this
requirement out by equipping the object with a function VerifyOutputValue that returns a
boolean value, provided v and σ. When invoked by a correct process, the function returns
true if and only if v has indeed been produced by the object. When “chaining” the objects,
i.e., adopting the output v provided by an object A as an input for another object B, which
is the typical scenario in our system, a correct process invokes A.VerifyOutputValue(v, σ),
where σ is the proof associated with v by the implementation of A. Only valid values returned
by A can be used as inputs to B.
Second, we face the “I still work here” attack [1]. It is possible that a slow client
tries to access a stale, outdated configuration in which some quorum is entirely compromised
by the Byzantine adversary. The client can therefore be provided with an inconsistent view
on the shared data. Thus, before accepting a new configuration, we need to make sure that
stale ones are no longer capable of processing data requests from the clients. We address this
issue via forward-secure signature schemes [10, 14]. Intuitively, every replica is provided with
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a distinct private key associated to each configuration. Before an “important” configuration
is replaced with a newer one, at least a quorum of its replicas are asked to destroy their
private keys. This way, even if the replicas are to become Byzantine in the future, they will
not be able to provide slow clients with inconsistent values. The stale configuration simply
becomes “non-responsive”, as in crash-fault tolerant reconfigurable systems.
Unfortunately, in an asynchronous system it is impossible to make sure that replicas of
all stale configurations remove their private keys as it would require solving consensus [16].
However, as we show in this paper, it is possible to make sure that the configurations in which
replicas do not remove their keys are never accessed by correct clients and are incapable of
creating “proofs” for output values.
Finally, there is a subtle, and quite interesting “slow reader” attack. Suppose that a
client accesses almost all replicas in a quorum of the current configuration each holding a
stale state, as the only correct replica in the quorum that has the up-to-date state has not yet
responded. The client then falls asleep, meanwhile the configuration is superseded by a new
one and is compromised by the adversary. In an asynchronous system, it might happen that
the replica that has not yet responded is compromised, while still holding its original private
keys. The replica can then “pretend” not to be aware of the current state. Therefore, the
slow client might still be able to complete its request in the superseded configuration, and
return a stale state. We show that this issue can be addressed by an additional “confirming”
round-trip executed by the client.
Our contribution: Byzantine fault-tolerant reconfigurable services. We provide a
systematic solution to each of the challenges described above and present a set of techniques
for building reconfigurable services in asynchronous model with Byzantine faults of both
clients and replicas. We consider a very strong model of the adversary: any number of clients
can be Byzantine and, as soon as some configuration is installed, no assumptions are made
about the correctness of replicas in any of the prior configurations.
Moreover, in our quest for a simple solution for the Byzantine model, we devised a new
approach to building asynchronous reconfigurable services by further exploring the connection
between reconfiguration and the lattice agreement abstraction [22, 25]. We believe that this
approach can be usefully applied to crash fault-tolerant systems as well.
Instead of trying to build a complex graph of configurations “on the fly” while transferring
the state between those configurations, we start by simply assuming that we are already
given a linear history (a.k.a. a sequence of configurations). We introduce the notion of a
dynamic object – an object that can transfer its own state between the configurations of a
given finite linear history and serve meaningful user requests. We then provide “dynamic”
implementations of several important object types such as Lattice Agreement and Max-
Register and expect that other asynchronous static algorithms can be translated to the
dynamic model using a similar set of techniques.
Finally, we present a general transformation that allows us to combine any dynamic object
with two Dynamic Byzantine Lattice Agreement objects in such a way that together they
constitute a single reconfigurable object, which exports a general-purpose reconfiguration
interface and supports all the operations of the original dynamic object.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We overview the model assumptions
in Section 2, define our abstractions in Section 3 and describe their implementations in
Section 4. We discuss related work Section 5 and conclude in Section 6. For space reasons,
we had to put some details of the discussion to the appendix. A discussion of the access
control problem in Byzantine fault-tolerant systems is delegated to Appendix A. Detailed
presentations and proofs of our algorithms are delegated to Appendices B and C. Our
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implementation of the dynamic max-register abstraction is presented in Appendix D.
2 System Model
Processes and channels.We consider a system that consists of two non-overlapping (pos-
sibly infinite) sets of processes: the set of replicas Φ, and the set of clients Π . At any point
in a given execution, a process can be in one of the four states: idle, correct, stopped, or
Byzantine. A process is idle if it has not taken a single step in the execution yet. A process
stops being idle by taking a step, e.g., sending or receiving a message. A process is considered
correct as long as it respects the algorithm it is assigned. A process is stopped if it executed
the “halt” command and not taking any further steps. Finally, a process is Byzantine if it
prematurely stops taking steps of the algorithm or takes steps that are not prescribed by it.
If a process remains correct forever, we say that it is forever-correct.
We assume asynchronous reliable authenticated point-to-point links between each pair of
processes [12]. If a forever-correct process p sends a message m to a forever-correct process
q, then q eventually delivers m. Morever, if a correct process q receives a message m from a
process p at time t, and p is correct at time t, then p has indeed sent m to q before t.
We assume that the adversary is computationally bound so that it is unable to break the
cryptographic techniques, such as digital signatures, forward security schemes [10, 14] and
one-way hash functions.
Configuration lattice. Join semi-lattice is a tuple (L,v), where L is a set partially ordered
by the binary relation v such that for all elements of x, y ∈ L, there exists the least upper
bound for the set {x, y}. The least upper bound of elements x, y ∈ L is a lattice element
z ∈ L such that x, y v z and ∀ w ∈ L : if x, y v w, then z v w. The least upper bound of
elements x and y is denoted by xunionsq y, and referred to as the join operator. unionsq is an associative,
commutative, and idempotent binary operator on L. We write x @ y whenever x v y and
x 6= y. We say that x, y ∈ L are comparable iff either x v y or y @ x.
For any set A, the powerset lattice of A, denoted by 2A, is the lattice of subsets of A.
∀ Z1, Z2 ∈ 2A : Z1 unionsq Z2 , Z1 ∪ Z2, Z1 v Z2 , Z1 ⊆ Z2.
A configuration is an element of a join semi-lattice (C,v). We assume that every
configuration is associated with a finite set of replicas via a map replicas : C → 2Φ, and a
quorum system via a map quorums : C → 22Φ , such that ∀C ∈ C : quorums(C) ⊆ 2replicas(C).
Additionally we assume that there is a monotonous mapping from configurations to numbers
Height : C → Z, such that ∀C1, C2 ∈ C : if C1 @ C2, then Height(C1) < Height(C2). We say
that a configuration C is higher than a configuration D iff D @ C, and that C is lower than
D iff C @ D.1
As we shall see, liveness properties of our reconfigurable system require that every “active”
configuration contains an “available” quorum, and safety properties require that every two
quorums of an “active” configuration have a correct replica in common.
In crash fault-tolerant systems, a configuration lattice can be naturally defined as follows [2,
31, 32, 3]: Updates , {+,−}×Φ, C , 2Updates, the join operator is the set union operation ∪,
replicas(C) , {s ∈ Φ | (+, s) ∈ C ∧ (−, s) /∈ C}, quorums(C) , {Q ⊆ replicas(C) | |Q| >
1
2 |replicas(C)|}, and Height(C) , |C|. In Byzantine fault-tolerant systems, the last condition
is replaced with |Q| > 23 |replicas(C)| [27] and the replicas’ public keys are distributed along
with their ids.
1 Notice that “C is higher than D” implies “Height(C) > Height(D)”, but not vice versa.
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Forward secure digital signatures. In the “I still work here” attack [1], a client may not
be aware that a configuration is already compromised by the Byzantine adversary. Therefore,
the client may obtain an inconsistent view on the shared data.
To anticipate this attack, before an “important” configuration is replaced with a new one,
we obligate all correct replicas in some quorum to destroy their private keys. This way, no
quorum of this configuration will be able to serve any future client’s request.
To this end, we use forward-secure digital signatures [10]: each process p maintains a
signing timestamp stp, a non-negative integer number, initially 0. Each process has access to
three operations:
1. UpdateFSKeys(t) sets stp to t ≥ stp;
2. FSSign(m, t) returns a signature for the message m and timestamp t, assuming t ≥ stp;
3. FSVerify(m, r, s, t) returns true iff s was generated by invoking FSSign(m, t) by process
r when str was less than or equal to t.
Note that it is by-design impossible, even for a Byzantine process, to change stp to a lower
value and to sign a message with a timestamp lower than the current value of stp.
One way to interpret this definition is to imagine a large sequence of private keys available
to the process, associated with a publicly known sequence of matching public keys. When a
correct replica performs UpdateFSKeys(t), it deletes all private keys with indices smaller than
t, and even if it turns Byzantine later on, it will not be able to recover these keys, and other
processes will still be able to trust messages signed by this replica with smaller timestamps.
We use timestamps to identify distinct configurations: every process p is assigned with a
distinct private key for each configuration.
Practical implementations of the forward-secure signature scheme assume a maximal
timestamp stmax, taken sufficiently large to accommodate all possible configuration changes.
A sequences of keys consumes O(Poly(log(stmax))) bytes of local storage, which allows us to
maintain sequences of very large (practically unbounded) sizes of the order of 264.
3 Abstractions and Definitions
We start by defining Access Control and Byzantine Lattice Agreement abstractions (Sec-
tions 3.1 and 3.2). We then introduce the important notions of reconfigurable and dynamic
objects (Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively), and recall the broadcast primitives that we intend
to use (Section 3.6.
3.1 Access Control abstraction
We introduce the Access Control abstraction (AC for short), which can be used to prevent
malicious, malformed, or excessively frequent requests from affecting correct clients. As we
discuss later, liveness properties of our reconfigurable objects require a sensible access control
policy to prevent Byzantine clients from flooding the system with reconfiguration requests.
Access Control abstraction exports one operation and one function:
Operation RequestCert(v) returns a certificate σ, which can be verified with
VerifyCert(v, σ), or the special value ⊥, indicating that the permission was denied;
Function VerifyCert(v, σ) returns a boolean value.
The implementation must satisfy the following property:
Certificate Verifiability: If RequestCert(v) returned σ to a correct process, then
VerifyCert(v, σ) = true.
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One way to implement the Access Control abstraction in a static system is to form a
certificate where v, the argument of RequestCert, is signed by each member of a quorum of
replicas. However, in most cases, there must be some additional application-specific logic,
according to which the correct replicas will decide if they should sign the suggested value.
Since access control is not the primary focus of this paper, we discuss different policies, their
dynamic implementations, and applications to building reconfigurable services in Appendix A.
3.2 Byzantine Lattice Agreement abstraction
Byzantine Lattice Agreement abstraction (BLA for short) is an adaptation of Lattice
Agreement [15] that tolerates Byzantine failures of processes (both clients and repli-
cas). It is parameterized by a lattice L, called the object lattice, and a boolean function
VerifyInputValue : L × Σ → {true, false}, where Σ is a set of possible certificates. We say
that σ is a valid certificate for input value v iff VerifyInputValue(v, σ) = true. This way we
abstract away the application-specific notions of “correct input values” and “allowed actions”.
We say that v is a verifiable input value in a given run iff at some point in time in
that run, some process knows a certificate σ that is valid for v, i.e., it maintains v and a
valid certificate σ in its local memory. We require that the adversary is unable to invert
VerifyInputValue by computing a valid certificate for a given value. This is the case, for
example, when σ must contain a set of unforgeable digital signatures.
The Byzantine Lattice Agreement abstraction exports one operation and one function:
Operation Propose(v, σ) that returns a response of the form 〈w, τ〉, where w ∈ L, σ is a
valid certificate for input value v, and τ is a certificate for output value w;
Function VerifyOutputValue(v, σ) that returns a boolean value.
Similarly to input values, we say that τ is a valid certificate for output value w iff
VerifyOutputValue(w, τ) = true. We say that w is a verifiable output value in a given
run iff at some point in that run, some process knows τ that is valid for w.
Implementations of Byzantine Lattice Agreement must satisfy the following properties:
Validity: Every verifiable output value w is a join of some set of verifiable input values;
Verifiability: If Propose(...) returns 〈w, τ〉 to a correct process, then
VerifyOutputValue(w, τ) = true;
Inclusion: If Propose(v, σ) returns 〈w, τ〉 to a correct process, then v v w;
Comparability: All verifiable output values are comparable2;
Operational Liveness: If the total number of verifiable input values is finite, every call to
Propose(v, σ) by a forever-correct process eventually terminates.
Notice that liveness is required only in the case of finitely many verifiable input values. This
is sufficient for the purposes of reconfiguration. The abstraction that provides unconditional
liveness is called Generalized Lattice Agreement [15] and is out of the scope of this paper.
3.3 Reconfigurable objects
First, let us define the notion of a history. In Section 2, we introduced the configuration
lattice C. A finite set h ⊆ C is called a history iff all elements of h are comparable (in other
words, if they form a sequence or chain).
A reconfigurable object exports one operation UpdateConfig(h, σ) and two up-calls:
NewHistory(h), used by all processes to indicate that they have updated their local histories,
2 Recall that values v and w are called comparable iff either v v w or w @ v.
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and InstalledConfig(C), used by replicas to indicate that they are ready to serve user requests
in configuration C. Each reconfigurable object must be parameterized by a boolean function
VerifyInputConfig : C × Σ→ {true, false}, where Σ is a set of possible certificates. We say
that C ∈ C is a verifiable input configuration in a given run iff at some point in that run,
some process knows σ such that VerifyInputConfig(C, σ) = true.
We require the total number of verifiable input configurations to be finite in any given
infinite execution of the protocol. Intuitively, this assumption precludes the scenario when
Byzantine clients invoke an infinite sequence of valid reconfiguration requests, undermining
system progress due to permanent reconfiguration. In practice, this boils down to assuming
sufficiently long periods of stability when no new verifiable input configurations appear. This
requirement is imposed by all asynchronous reconfigurable storage systems [1, 32, 25, 3] we
are aware of, and, in fact, can be shown to be necessary [30].
The reconfiguration mechanism must provide an illusion of a unique global history.
However, unambiguously agreeing on the contents of this history among several processes
would require solving consensus, which is known to be impossible in asynchronous systems [16].
Hence, in our system, each process is only aware of some subsequence of the global history.
These subsequences are called local histories of the processes. When a process updates its
local history, it indicates this fact by triggering NewHistory(h). We say that this process
adopts the history h.
A configuration C is called candidate if it appears in the local history of a correct
process. In other words, if some correct process has triggered NewHistory(h) such that
C ∈ h. We say that a replica installs configuration C when it triggers InstalledConfig(C)
up-call. A configuration is called installed if some correct replica installed it. Finally, a
candidate configuration is called superseded if some higher configuration is installed, and
active otherwise.
Intuitively, candidate configurations are those considered by the protocol. Installation
means that the configuration has received all the necessary information from prior configura-
tions and has made sure that the older configurations are “harmless”. Thereby, superseded
configurations are those, on which we do not rely anymore. Replicas that do not belong to
any active configuration can be safely turned off or even become Byzantine.
Each reconfigurable object must satisfy the following properties:
Reconfiguration Validity: If some correct process triggered NewHistory(h), then h is a
well-formed history (i.e., h ⊆ C and all elements of h are comparable), and ∀C ∈ h : C is
a join of some set of valid input configurations;
Reconfiguration Liveness: Every call to UpdateConfig(C, σ) will eventually terminate,
and the client will eventually have C or a higher configuration in its local history;
History Comparability: All local histories of correct processes are related by containment,
i.e. if a correct process p triggers NewHistory(h1), and a correct process q triggers
NewHistory(h2), then either h1 ⊆ h2 or h2 ⊂ h1. Moreover, if some process triggers
NewHistory(h1), and, later on, this process triggers NewHistory(h2), then h1 ⊆ h2;
Installation Validity: Only a candidate configuration can be installed by a correct replica;
History Convergence: Local histories of all correct processes will eventually become
identical;
Installation Liveness: If configuration C is in the local history of a forever-correct
process, either C or a higher configuration will eventually be installed. Moreover, if some
configuration C is installed, each correct replica will eventually install C or a higher
configuration.
Reconfiguration Validity and Installation Validity are simple sanity properties. History
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Comparability ensures that all processes have consistent views of the system. History
Convergence and Installation Liveness ensure the progress of the system. Intuitively, since
the total number of verifiable input configurations is assumed to be finite, all correct processes
will converge to the same “final” history (by History Convergence), and the latest configuration
in that history will eventually be installed by all correct replicas (by Installation Liveness).
Additionaly, Reconfiguration Liveness requires that every call to UpdateConfig(C, σ) by a
correct process eventually terminates.
3.4 Dynamic objects
Dynamic objects are similar to reconfigurable objects, but instead of UpdateConfig(C, σ),
they have operation UpdateHistory(h, σ), and instead of VerifyInputConfig(C, σ), they must
be parameterized by a boolean function VerifyHistory : H× Σ→ {true, false}, where H is
the set of all histories and Σ is the set of all possible certificates. We say that h is a verifiable
history iff at some point in time some process knows σ such that VerifyHistory(h, σ) = true.
As with verifiable input configurations, the total number of verifiable histories is required to
be finite. Additionally, we require all verifiable histories to be related by containment, i.e. if
VerifyHistory(h1, σ1) = true and VerifyHistory(h2, σ2), then either h1 ⊆ h2 or h2 ⊂ h1. We
discuss how to build such histories in Section 4.2.
Similarly to reconfigurable objects, a dynamic object must have NewHistory(h) and
InstalledConfig(C) up-calls and satisfy the History Comparability, Installation Validity, His-
tory Convergence, and Installation Liveness properties. However, instead of Reconfiguration
Validity and Reconfiguration Liveness, it must satisfy two other properties:
Dynamic Validity: A correct process may trigger up-call NewHistory(h) only for a
verifiable history h;
Dynamic Liveness: Every invocation of UpdateHistory(h) by a forever-correct client will
eventually terminate. Moreover, the client will eventually trigger up-call NewHistory(h′)
such that h ⊆ h′.
While reconfigurable objects provide general-purpose reconfiguration interface, dynamic
objects are more restrictive in a sense that they impose strict comparability requirement on
the verifiable histories. The main contribution of this paper is that we show how to build
dynamic objects in Byzantine environment and how to create reconfigurable objects using
dynamic objects as building blocks. We argue that this technique might be applicable to a
large class of objects and examplify our claim with dynamic (and reconfigurable) versions of
Byzantine Lattice Agreement and Max-Register [6, 27].
3.5 Intersection, availability, and configuration sanity
Safety and liveness of our dynamic and reconfigurable objects rely upon specific assumptions
on the quorum systems associated with candidate configurations.
For safety, we require the Quorum Intersection property: for every active candidate
configuration C, for all Q1, Q2 ∈ quorums(C), Q1 ∩Q2 contains a correct process.
For liveness, we require the Quorum Availability property: for every candidate con-
figuration C that is never superseded, there is always a quorum Q ∈ quorums(C) that
consists of correct replicas. This is equivalent to saying that there exists Q ∈ quorums(C)
that consists entirely of forever-correct replicas.
Once a configuration is superseded, its quorums can become unavailable or compromised.
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3.6 Broadcast primitives
To make sure that no slow process is “left behind”, we assume that a variant of reliable
broadcast primitive [12] is available. The primitive must ensure two properties: (1) If a forever-
correct process p broadcasts a messagem, then p eventually deliversm; (2) If some messagem
is delivered by a forever-correct process, every forever-correct process eventually delivers
m. In practice such primitive can be implemented by some sort of a gossip protocol [23].
This primitive is “global” in a sense that it is not bound to any particular configuration. In
pseudocode we use “RB-Broadcast 〈...〉” to denote a call to the “global” reliable broadcast.
Additionally, we assume a “local” uniform reliable broadcast primitive [12]. It has a
stronger totality property: if some correct process p delivered some message m, then every
forever-correct process will eventually deliver m, even if p later turns Byzantine. This
primitive can be implemented in a static system, provided a quorum system. As we deal
with dynamic systems, we associate every broadcast message with a fixed configuration and
only guarantee these properties if the configuration is never superseded. Notice that any
static implementation of uniform reliable broadcast trivially guarantees this property. In
pseudocode we use “URB-Broadcast 〈...〉 in C” to denote a call to the “local” uniform
reliable broadcast in configuration C.
4 Building dynamic and reconfigurable objects
In this section, we present our technique for creating dynamic and reconfigurable objects
as defined in Sections 3.4 and 3.3, respectively. First, in Section 4.1, we present our
implementation of the dynamic version of the Byzantine Lattice Agreement abstraction
defined in Section 3.2, which is the main building block in our approach to creating any
reconfigurable objects. Second, in Section 4.2, we show how to construct reconfigurable
objects out of dynamic ones. To respect space limits, the complete pseudocode, the proof of
correctness, and further discussion are delegated to Appendices B and C.
4.1 Dynamic Byzantine Lattice Agreement
Dynamic Byzantine Lattice Agreement abstraction (DBLA for short) is the main building
block in our approach for constructing reconfigurable objects. Its specification is a combina-
tion of the specification of Byzantine Lattice Agreement (Section 3.2) and the specification of
a dynamic object (Section 3.4). The abstraction exports two operations: Propose(v, σ) and
UpdateHistory(h, σ), two up-calls: NewHistory(h) and InstalledConfig(C), and one func-
tion: VerifyOutputValue(w, τ). The abstraction is parameterized by two boolean functions:
VerifyInputValue(v, σ) and VerifyInputConfig(C, σ), and must satisfy a set of properties
defined in Sections 3.2 and 3.4 such as Comparability, Installation Liveness, and Dynamic
Validity.
The pseudocode for our algorithm is partially presented in Algorithms 1 and 2. The
complete pseudocode and the proof of correctness are put in Appendix B. Here we try to
convey the most important ideas and design decisions.
The “replica-centric” approach. Most papers on crash-fault tolerant reconfiguration
take the client-centric approach to state transfer [2, 22, 25, 32]. In those algorithms the client
is responsible for reading the state from the replicas of older configurations and relaying
it to the replicas of a new configuration. This approach is appealing because it has small
communication complexity when there are few clients. However, the client-centric approach
becomes significantly more expensive and harder to implement if we assume that some clients
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Algorithm 1 DBLA: code for client p (short version)
1: operation Propose(v, σ)
2: Refine({〈v, σ〉})
3: wait for ContainsQuorum(acks2,HighestConf(history))
4: status ← inactive
5: let σ = 〈curVals, history, σhistory, acks1, acks2〉
6: return 〈JoinAll(curVals), σ〉
7: operation UpdateHistory(h, σ)
8: RB-Broadcast 〈NewHistory, h, σ〉
9: procedure Refine(vs)
10: acks1 ← ∅; acks2 ← ∅
11: curVals ← curVals ∪ vs
12: seqNum ← seqNum + 1 . used to match requests with pesponses
13: status ← proposing
14: let C = HighestConf(history)
15: send 〈Propose, curVals, seqNum, C〉 to replicas(C)
16: upon receive 〈ProposeResp, vs, sig, sn〉 from replica r
17: let sigValid = FSVerify(〈ProposeResp, vs〉, r, sig,Height(HighestConf(history)))
18: if status = proposing ∧ sn = seqNum ∧ sigValid then
19: if vs * curVals ∧VerifyInputValues(vs \ curVals) then Refine(vs)
20: else if vs = curVals then acks1 ← acks1 ∪ {〈r, sig〉}
21: upon ContainsQuorum(acks1,HighestConf(history))
22: status ← confirming
23: let C = HighestConf(history)
24: send 〈Confirm, acks1, seqNum, C〉 to replicas(C)
25: upon RB-deliver 〈NewHistory, h, σ〉 from any sender
26: if VerifyHistory(h, σ) ∧ history ⊂ h then
27: history ← h; σhistory ← σ
28: trigger up-call NewHistory(h)
29: if status ∈ {proposing, confirming} then Refine(∅)
can be Byzantine. Instead, we take the replica-centric approach to state transfer [3]. That is,
the replicas of a new configuration are responsible for reading the state from the replicas of
prior configurations.
Pivotal and tentative configurations. As we mentioned earlier, we use forward-secure
signatures to guarantee that superseded configurations cannot affect correct clients or forge
certificates for output values. However, due to asynchrony, it is impossible to acess all prior
configurations when installing a new one. We say that a configuration is pivotal if it is
the last configuration in some verifiable history. Other candidate configurations are called
tentative.
Intuitively, the pivotal configurations are the configurations that can potentially be
installed by a correct replica and to which a correct client can potentially make a request.
The (useless) tentative configurations are the “necessary evil” of the asynchronous model.
Eliminating or detecting them would require solving consensus. As we prove in Appendix B.2,
our protocol ensures that tentative configurations are always “harmless” and that pivotal
configurations are “harmless” after they are superseded.
Client implementation. Let us first take the perspective of a correct client (Algortihm 1).
Since the state transfer is handled by the replicas, the client’s code is rather simple yet there
are several important details.
Our BLA implementation builds upon the (crash fault-tolerant static) implementation of
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Algorithm 2 DBLA: code for replica p (short version)
1: upon receive 〈Propose, vs, sn, C〉 from client c
2: wait for C = Cinst ∨ C @ HighestConf(history)
3: if C = HighestConf(history) ∧VerifyInputValues(vs \ curVals) then
4: curVals ← curVals ∪ vs
5: let sig = FSSign(〈ProposeResp, curVals〉,Height(C))
6: send 〈ProposeResp, curVals, sig, sn〉 to c
. State transfer
7: upon Ccurr 6= HighestConf({C ∈ history | p ∈ replicas(C)})
8: let Cnext = HighestConf({C ∈ history | p ∈ replicas(C)})
9: let S = {C ∈ history | Ccurr v C @ Cnext}
10: seqNum ← seqNum + 1 . used to match requests with responses
11: for each C ∈ S do
12: send 〈UpdateRead, seqNum, C〉 to replicas(C)
13: wait for (C @ Ccurr ) ∨ (responses from any Q ∈ quorums(C) with s.n. seqNum)
14: if Ccurr @ Cnext then
15: Ccurr ← Cnext
16: URB-Broadcast 〈UpdateComplete〉 in Cnext
17: upon RB-deliver 〈NewHistory, h, σ〉 from any sender
18: if VerifyHistory(h, σ) ∧ history ⊂ h then
19: history ← h
20: trigger up-call NewHistory(h)
21: UpdateFSKeys(Height(HighestConf(history)))
22: upon URB-deliver 〈UpdateComplete〉 in C from quorum Q ∈ quorums(C)
23: wait for C ∈ history
24: if Cinst @ C then
25: if Ccurr @ C then Ccurr ← C
26: Cinst ← C
27: trigger up-call InstalledConfig(C)
28: if p ∈ replicas(Ccurr ) ∧ p /∈ replicas(C) then halt
lattice agreement by Faleiro et al. [15]. An important difference is that, instead of operating
directly on the object lattice L, internally we operate with sets of verifiable input values, in
other words, with the power lattice 2L, and only join them before returning the result to the
client (line 6). While yielding the same result, this trick helps us to preserve the Validity
property of BLA: every output value is, indeed, a join of some set of verifiable input values.
To propose a new value, the client first needs to call the Refine procedure (Algorithm 1,
lines 9–15). It will add the value to the set of all verifiable input values the client is aware of
(curVals, line 11) and send a Propose message to all replicas of the most recent configuration
in the client’s local history (line 15). If this configuration turns out to be outdated, the client
will eventually learn about a newer configuration and will simply repeat its request there
(line 29). This is safe because lattice agreement operations are idempotent, which means that
an operation can be applied several times with the same result as if it was applied only once.
In response to the client’s Propose message, the replicas will send ProposeResp
messages (see Algorithm 1, lines 16–20), each of which will contain the set of verifiable input
values known to the replica (vs), a forward-secure signature (sig) (see Section 2), and a
sequence number (sn). If the client learns any new verifiable input values from a response
(line 19), it will repeat the Refine procedure with the new values. Since we assume that the
total number of verifiable input values is finite in any given infinite execution, this process
will eventually converge. If the client receives a ProposeResp message without any new
verifiable input values in it, it will add this message to the set of acknowledgments (line 20).
Notice the additional check (vs = curVals). This condition is always true if the sender is
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correct. It is only needed to filter out malformed acknowledgments from Byzantine replicas.
Upon gathering a quorum of such acknowledgments (line 21), the client proceeds to the
second stage of the protocol, which we will cover in the next paragraph. Now we would like
to emphasize the use of forward-secure signatures here. It is what allows us to mitigate the
“I still work here” attack. As we will see below, our state transfer protocol ensures that
before any pivotal configuration is superseded, all correct replicas in some quorum of that
configuration will invoke UpdateFSKeys (in other words, will remove their private keys for
that configuration). If the client tries to access a configuration that was superseded long before
the client’s request, it simply will not receive enough responses with valid forward-secure
signatures and will eventually retry its request in a higher configuration (line 29).
The primary goal of the second stage is to mitigate the “slow reader” attack. The client
simply sends the acknowledgments it has collected in the first stage to the replicas and asks
them to sign with their forward-secure signatures that they have seen these acknowledgments
before they updated their private keys, i.e., before this configuration was superseded. By this,
we confirm that the configuration used in the first stage was not meanwhile superseded.
Replica implementation. Now, let us take the pespective of a correct replica (Algorithm 2).
Each Propose message has some configuration identifier attached to it. When a correct
replica recieves a Propose message from a correct client, there are three possible cases
(lines 1–6):
1. If the message is from the highest configuration in the replica’s local history
(HighestConf(history)), and this configuration is installed by this replica (C = Cinst),
the replica will process this message and will send a reply, signed with a forward-secure
signature with timestamp Height(C) (line 6);
2. If the message is from a configuration that is lower than HighestConf(history), the replica
will drop this message. This cannot undermine liveness of client requests because, if
both the client and the replica remain correct forever, the client will either complete the
request without this replica’s help, or eventually learn about a higher configuration and
repeat its request there;
3. Otherwise, the replica “waits” (line 2). That is, the message is stored locally until one of
the two conditions above is satisfied.
A major part of the replica’s implementation is the state transfer procedure (lines 7–16).
Whenever a replica sees that its “current configuration” (Ccurr) is not the highest one in its
local history, it tries to read the state from a quorum in each of the intermidiate configurations
between Ccurr and the highest configuration (Cnext) one by one. If the replica succeeds
before Cnext or a higher configuration is installed, it updates Ccurr to Cnext and lets the
other replicas know about. It uses the uniform reliable broadcast primitive we introduced
in Section 3.6 to disseminate message 〈UpdateComplete〉 among the correct replicas of
Cnext (line 16). If, on the other hand, it happens that the replica is waiting for responses
from some configuration C, and this configuration is already superseded, then it might never
gather a quorum of replies from the replicas of this configuration. In this case our algorithm
ensures that this replica will eventually install some configuration higher than C and will
finish waiting via the other condition (C @ Ccurr).
When a replica learns about a new verifiable history (line 17), it updates its private keys
so that it will never again be able to answer any user request in a configuration lower than the
highest configuration in this new history (line 21). Due to the properties of reliable broadcast,
unless this replica halts or turns Byzantine, every other correct process will eventually also
learn about this history and abandon lower configurations. When a correct replica reads the
state from some prior configuration C during state transfer (lines 12–13), it is responsible to
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VIV ConfLA HistLA
VIV DObj
VH
VH
VIVVerifyInputConfig
VerifyInputValue
(a) Reconfigurable object
VIV ConfLA HistLA
VIVObjAC DObj
VH
VH
VIVConfAC
(b) Reconfigurable object with Access Control
Figure 1 (a): The structure of our reconfigurable objects. All three dynamic objects use HistLA
as the source of verifiable histories (including HistLA itself). Verifiable input values for ConfLA are the
verifiable input configurations of the reconfigurable object. Verifiable input values for HistLA are singleton
sets of verifiable output values of ConfLA. Finally, verifiable input values for DObj are the verifiable
input values of the reconfigurable object. (b): An example of a reconfigurable object without external
dependencies. ConfAC and ObjAC are instances of the Dynamic Access Control abstraction.
make sure that some quorum Q ∈ quorums(C) updated their forward-secure private keys to
a timestamp larger than Height(C). This is achieved by a simple mechanism: the replicas
of C will not reply to the UpdateRead messages until they update their private keys far
enough (until C @ HighestConf(history)).
4.2 Making dynamic objects reconfigurable
While dynamic objects are important building blocks, they are not particularly useful by
themselves because they assume that all verifiable input histories are comparable. In this
section we show how to combine several dynamic objects to obtain a single reconfigurable
object.
As described in Section 3.3, compared to the “static” versions, reconfigurable objects have
one more operation – UpdateConfig(C, σ), must be parameterized by a boolean function
VerifyInputConfig(C, σ), and must satisfy a few additional properties such as Reconfiguration
Validity and Installation Liveness.
We build a reconfigurable object by combining three dynamic ones. First of all, the
dynamic object that we want to make reconfigurable (let us call it DObj). For example, it
can be an instance of DBLA if you wanted to make a reconfigurable version of Byzantine
Lattice Agreement. Two others are used to build verifiable histories: ConfLA is a DBLA
operating on the configuration lattice C, and HistLA is a DBLA operating on the power
lattice 2C .
Algorithm 3 Reconfigurable object: code for process process p (short version)
. Client’s code
1: Data operations are performed directly on DObj.
2: operation UpdateConfig(C, σ)
3: let 〈D,σD〉 = ConfLA.Propose(C, σ)
4: let 〈h, σh〉 = HistLA.Propose({D}, σD)
5: RB-Broadcast 〈NewHistory, h, σ〉
. Replica’s code
6: upon receive up-call InstalledConfig(C) from all DObj, HistLA, and DObj
7: trigger up-call InstalledConfig(C)
The relations between the three dynamic objects are shown in Figure 1a. The short,
quite straightforward version of the pseudocode is presented in Algorithm 3. To update a
configuration, the client first accesses ConfLA and then submits the returned configuration
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(with its proof) to HistLA. The resulting history is broadcast (using the reliable-broadcast
primitive) and is used to reconfigure all three dynamic objects. Thus, the three dynamic
objects are tied together. They “live through” the same history of reconfigurations and can
be seen as three parts of the same algorithm rather than separate entities.
The complete pseudocode of the transformation and the proof of its correctness are
presented in Appendix C.
Eliminating external dependencies. Most abstractions that we define and imple-
ment in this paper rely on external parameters: functions VerifyInputValue(v, σ) and
VerifyInputConfig(C, σ). This allows us to connect several objects into larger systems
(as shown in Figure 1) and abstracts away application-specific details. Figure 1b shows
an example of a “self-contained” object without any external dependencies. The idea is
very simple: add two instances of the dynamic version of the Access Control abstraction
we introduced in Section 3.1 that will serve as the gateways for the object. These dynamic
objects will be reconfigured along with ConfLA, HistLA, and DObj. We discuss different
implementations of the Dynamic Access Control abstraction in Appendix A.
5 Related work
Dynamic replicated systems with passive reconfiguration [9, 7, 24] do not explicitly regulate
arrivals and departures of replicas. Their consistency properties are ensured under strong
assumptions on the churn rate. Except for the recent work [24], churn-tolerant storage
systems do not tolerate Byzantine failures. In contrast, active reconfiguration allows the
clients to explicitly propose configuration updates, e.g., sets of new replica arrivals and
departures.
Early proposals of (actively) reconfigurable storage systems tolerating process crashes,
such as RAMBO [21] and reconfigurable Paxos [26], used consensus (and, thus, assumed
certain level of synchrony) to ensure that the clients agree on the evolution of configurations.
Dynastore [2] was the first asynchronous reconfigurable storage: clients propose incremental
additions or removals to the system configuration. As the proposals commute, the processes
can resolve their disagreements without involving consensus.
The parsimonious speculative snapshot task [18] allows to resolve conflicts between
concurrent configuration updates in a storage system using instances of commit-adopt [17].
The worst-case time complexity, in the number of message delays, of reconfiguration was
later put down from O(n2) to O(n) [32], where n is the number of concurrently proposed
configuration updates.
SmartMerge [22] made an important step forward by treating reconfiguration as an
instance of abstract lattice agreement [15]. However, the algorithm assumes an external
(reliable) lattice agreement service which makes the system not fully reconfigurable. The
recently proposed reconfigurable lattice-agreement abstraction [25] enables truly reconfigurable
versions of a large class of objects and constructions, including state-based CRDTs[29],
atomic-snapshot, max-register, conflict detector and commit-adopt. We believe that the
reconfiguration service we introduced in this paper can be used to derive Byzantine fault-
tolerant reconfigurable implementations of objects in the class.
Byzantine quorum systems [27] introduce abstractions for ensuring availability and
consistency of shared data in asynchronous systems with Byzantine faults. In particular,
a dissemination quorum system ensures that every two quorums have a correct process in
common and that at least one quorum only contains correct processes. In this paper, assume
that a configuration that is never superseded must be equipped with a dissemination quorum.
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Dynamic Byzantine quorum systems [4] appear to be the first attempt to implement
a form of active reconfiguration in a Byzantine fault-tolerant data service running on a
static set of replicas, where clients can raise or lower the resilience threshold. Dynamic
Byzantine storage [28] allows a trusted administrator to issue ordered reconfiguration calls
that might also change the set of replicas. The administrator also takes care of “forgetting”
configuration keys to anticipate the “I still work here” attack [1]. In this paper, we propose
an implementation of a Byzantine fault-tolerant reconfiguration service that does not rely on
this assumption.
Forward-secure signature schemes [10, 14] enable a decentralized way to construct a
sequence of distinct private keys for each process. We use the scheme to provide each process
with a unique private key for each element of the configuration lattice. To counter the “I still
work here” attack, we ensure that correct processes destroy their configuration keys before a
new configuration is installed, without relying on a global agreement of the configuration
sequence [28].
6 Discussion
The general case. While we do not provide any general approach for building dynamic
objects, we expect that most static algorithms in asynchronous model can be adopted to the
dynamic case by applying the same set of techniques. These techniques include our state
transfer protocol (relying on forward-secure signatures), the use of an additional round-trip
to prevent the “slow reader” attack, and the structure of our cryptographic proofs that
ensures that tentative configurations cannot create a valid certificate for any output value.
To illustrate this, in Appendix D, we present the dynamic version of Max-Register [5]. We
also discuss the dynamic version of the Access Control abstraction in Appendix A.
Communication cost. We did not try to provide the optimal implementations of each object
or to implement the most general abstractions (such as generalized lattice agreement [15, 25]).
Instead, we focused on providing minimal implementation for the minimal set of abstractions
to demonstrate the ideas and the general techniques for defining and building reconfigurable
services in the harsh world of asynchrony and Byzantine failures. Therefore, we left plenty of
space for optimizations. We discuss a few possible directions in Appendix B.3, after providing
the full implementation of DBLA. Most of them aim at reducing the size of the proofs.
Open questions. We would like to mention two directions that are most relevant to this
paper.
First, with regard to active reconfiguration, it would be interesting to see more efficient
algorithms for “small” configuration changes while still supporting completely changing the
set of replicas in one reconfiguration request. In this paper we assume that the sets of
replicas of all configurations might be completely disjoint. Therefore, we have this expensive
quorum-to-quorum communication pattern, which seems completely unnecessary if the set of
replicas changes only slightly after each reconfiguration.
Second, with regard to Byzantine faults, it would be interesting to consider models
with “weaker” adversary. In this paper we assumed a very strong model of the adversary:
no assumptions are made about correctness of replicas in superseded configurations. This
“pessimistic” approach leads to more complicated and expensive protocols.
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A Dynamic Access Control
In this section we present several dynamic implementations of the Access Control abstraction
defined in Section 3.1 and disscuss their application to managing reconfiguration request.
A.1 Sanity-check approach
One of the simplest access control policies in a static system is to require at least b + 1
replicas to sign each certificate, where b is the maximal possible number of Byzantine
replicas, sometimes called the resilience threshold. The correct replicas can perform some
application-specific sanity checks before approving requests.
The key property of this approach is that it guarantees that each valid certificate is signed
by at least one correct replica. In many cases, this is enough to guarantee resilience both
against the Sybil attacks [13] and against flooding the system with reconfiguration requests.
The correct replicas can check the identities of new participants and refuse to sign excessively
frequent requests.
In dynamic asynchronous systems just providing b+ 1 signatures isn’t enough. Despite
the use of forward-secure signatures, in a superseded pivotal configuration there might be
significantly more than b Byzantine replicas with their private keys not removed (in fact, at
least 2b). The straightforward way to implement this policy in a dynamic system is to add
the confirming phase, as in our implementation of Dynamic Byzantine Lattice Agreement
(see Section 4.1), after collecting b+1 signed approvals. The confirming phase guarantees that
during the execution of the first phase the configuration was relevant (i.e., not superseded).
The state transfer protocol should be the same as for DBLA with the exception that no
actual state is being transferred. It is needed only to ensure that the replicas of superseded
pivotal configurations update their private keys before new configurations are installed.
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Algorithm 4 Vote-Based Access Control
. Client’s code
1: operation RequestCert(v)
2: let C = HighestConf(history)
3: seqNum ← seqNum + 1 . used to match requests with responses
. Phase one: request
4: send 〈Request, v, seqNum, C〉 to replicas(C)
5: wait for (HighestConf(history) 6= C) ∨ (received enough Yes-votes with valid signatures)
6: ∨ (received a quorum of votes in total)
7: if HighestConf(history) 6= C then retry (goto line 2)
8: if received not enough valid Yes-votes then return ⊥ . access denied
9: let acks1 = {Yes-votes received on line 6}
. Phase two: confirm
10: send 〈Confirm, acks1, seqNum, C〉 to replicas(C)
11: wait for (HighestConf(history) 6= C) ∨ (replies from a quorum of replicas with valid signatures)
12: if HighestConf(history) 6= C then retry (goto line 2)
13: let acks2 = {acknowledgments received on line 11}
. Return certificate
14: return 〈history, σhistory, acks1, acks2〉
. Replica’s code
15: upon receive 〈Request, v, sn, C〉 from client c
16: wait for C = Cinst ∨ C @ HighestConf(history)
17: if C = HighestConf(history) then
18: if VoteYes(v) then send 〈Yes, FSSign(〈Yes, v, c〉,Height(C)), sn〉 to c
19: else send 〈No, sn〉 to c
20: upon receive 〈Confirm, acks, sn, C〉 from client c
21: wait for C ∈ history
22: if C = HighestConf(history) then
23: let sig = FSSign(〈ConfirmResp, acks〉,Height(C))
24: send 〈ConfirmResp, sig, sn〉 to c
This and the following approach can be generally described as “vote-based” access control
policies. The pseudocode for their dynamic implementation is presented in Algorithm 4.
A.2 Quorum-based approach (“on-chain governance”)
A more powerful strategy in a static system is to require a quorum of replicas to sign each
certificate. An important property of this implementation is that it can detect and prevent
conflicting requests. More formally, suppose that there are values v1 and v2, for which the
following two properties should hold:
Both are acceptable: RequestCert(vi) should not return ⊥ unless RequestCert(vj) was
invoked in the same execution, where j 6= i.
At most one may be accepted: if some process knows σi such that VerifyCert(vi, σi) then
no process should know σj such that VerifyCert(vj , σj).
Note that it is possible that neither v1 nor v2 is accepted by the Access Control if the requests
are made concurrently. To guarantee that exactly one certificate is issued, we would need to
implement consensus, which is impossible in asynchronous model [16]. If a correct replica
has signed a certificate for value vi, it should store this fact in persistent memory and refuse
signing vj if requested. Due to the quorum intersection property, this guarantees the “at
most one” semantic in a static system.
This approach can be implemented in a dynamic system using the same pseudocode from
Algorithm 4 and the state transfer protocol from our DBLA implementation (Algorithm 2,
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lines 7–16).
Using the dynamic version of this approach to certifying reconfiguration requests allows
us to capture the notion of what is sometimes called “on-chain governance”. The idea is that
the participants of the system (in our case, the owners of the replicas) decide which actions
or updates to allow by the means of voting. Every decision needs a quorum of signed votes
to be considered valid and no two conflicting decisions can be made.
A.3 Trusted administrators (the “centralized” approach)
A naive yet common approach to dynamic systems is to have a trusted administrator, who
signs the reconfiguration requests. However, if the administrator’s private key is lost, the
system might lose liveness, and if it is compromised, the system might lose safety. A more
viable approach is to have n administrators and to require b + 1 of them to sign every
certificate, for some n and b such that 0 ≤ b < n. In this case, the system will “survive” up
to b keys being compromised and up to n− (b+ 1) keys being lost.
An interesting problem, which we will not dive into here, is to allow changing the set of
administrators. One possible solution would be to “run a reconfiguration protocol” among the
administrators. Another approach is to include the set of administrators to the configuration
lattice C of the reconfigurable object itself and to use normal reconfiguration requests to
change the set of administrators.
B Dynamic BLA: complete implementation and proofs
We define and describe the implementation of our Dynamic Byzantine Lattice Agreement
abstraction in Section 4.1. Here we would like to present the complete pseudocode, clarify
several details, and provide additional discussion of the protocol (Section B.1), give a rigorous
proof of correctness (Section B.2), and, finally, describe possible directions for optimizations
(Section B.3).
B.1 Implementation
Our implementation of the DBLA abstraction is split into four parts: Algorithms 5 and 6
describe the behaviour of a correct client while Algorithms 7 and 8 describe the behaviour of
a correct replica. In the begining of Algorithms 5 and 7 we describe all parameters, global
variables, and auxiliary functions used in the code.
Additionally, we use “RB-Broadcast 〈MessageDescriptor, msgParams ...〉” to denote
the call to the global reliable broadcast primitive introduced in Section 3.6, and “URB-
Broadcast 〈MessageDescriptor, msgParams ...〉 in C” to denote the call to the local
uniform reliable broadcast primitive in configuration C (see Section 3.6).
Execution environment. We assume single-threaded execution of the pseudocode. The
lines of code are to be executed one by one in a sequential order. Some events (such as
message delivery or an assignment to a global variable) may activate some handlers, but
the execution of these handlers is delayed. However, we expect some “fairness” in a sense
that if some handler remains “ready” indefinitely, it will eventually be executed. Sometimes
waiting is explicitly mentioned in the code (e.g., Algorithm 5, line 19). In these places we
assume that the control flow may switch to other blocks. It may later return to the line after
the “wait for” statement if the condition in the statement is satisfied.
Notation. We use “let var = expession” to denote an assignment to a local variable
and “var ← expression” to denote an assignment to a global variable (they are usually
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Algorithm 5 DBLA: code for process p (client, part I)
Parameters:
1: Lattice of configurations C and the initial configuration Cinit
2: The object lattice L and the initial value Vinit
3: Boolean functions VerifyHistory(h, σ) and VerifyInputValue(v, σ)
Global variables:
4: history ⊆ C, initially {Cinit} . local history of this process
5: σhistory ∈ Σ, initially ⊥ . proof for the local history
6: curVals ⊆ L× Σ, initially {〈Vinit ,⊥〉} . known verifiable input values with proofs
7: status ∈ {inactive, proposing, confirming}, initially inactive
8: seqNum ∈ Z, initially 0 . used to match requests with responses
9: acks1, initially ∅ . a set of pairs of form 〈processId, sig〉
10: acks2, initially ∅ . a set of pairs of form 〈processId, sig〉
Auxiliary functions:
11: HighestConf(h) . returns the highest configuration in history h
12: ContainsQuorum(acks, C) . returns true iff ∃Q ∈ quorums(C) such that ∀r ∈ Q : 〈r, ∗〉 ∈ acks
13: JoinAll(vs) . returns the lattice join of all elements in vs
14: VerifyInputValues(vs) . returns true iff ∀〈v, σ〉 ∈ vs : VerifyInputValue(v, σ)
15: Height(C) . returns the height of configuration C (see Section 2)
16: FSVerify(m, r, s, t) . verifies forward-secure signature (see Section 2)
17: operation Propose(v, σ)
18: Refine({〈v, σ〉})
19: wait for ContainsQuorum(acks2,HighestConf(history))
20: status ← inactive
21: let σ = 〈curVals, history, σhistory, acks1, acks2〉
22: return 〈JoinAll(curVals), σ〉
23: operation UpdateHistory(h, σ)
24: RB-Broadcast 〈NewHistory, h, σ〉
25: function VerifyOutputValue(v, σ)
26: if σ = ⊥ then return v = Vinit
27: let 〈vs, h, σh, proposeAcks, confirmAcks〉 = σ
28: let C = HighestConf(h)
29: return JoinAll(vs) = v ∧VerifyHistory(h, σh)
30: ∧ ContainsQuorum(proposeAcks, C) ∧ ContainsQuorum(confirmAcks, C)
31: ∧ ∀ 〈r, s〉 ∈ proposeAcks : FSVerify(〈ProposeResp, vs〉, r, s,Height(C))
32: ∧ ∀ 〈r, s〉 ∈ confirmAcks : FSVerify(〈ConfirmResp, proposeAcks〉, r, s,Height(C))
defined in the “Global variables” section). We use triangle brackets to denote tupples
and messages. They might start with a message descriptor, which is written in bold
(e.g., 〈Propose, curVals, seqNum, C〉).
The use of powerset lattice. In our implementation, we internally use the powerset lattice
2L and only join the values before returning the result to the client (Algorithm 5, line 22).
This gives the right result because of one simple observation: if A,B ∈ 2L and A ⊆ B, then,
by associativity and commutativity, JoinAll(B) = JoinAll(A)unionsq JoinAll(B \A). By definition
of “unionsq”, JoinAll(A) v JoinAll(A)unionsq JoinAll(B \A). This approach makes it easy to guarantee
the Validity property of BLA, but in some cases it might increase the communication cost
(i.e., the number of bytes exchanged through the network) and the number of rounds needed
to terminate.
Number of accessed configurations. By accessing ConfLA and then HistLA, we minimize
the number of configurations that should be accessed for a consistent configuration shift.
Indeed, due to the Comparability property of Byzantine Lattice Agreement, all configurations
submitted to HistLA will already be ordered and any set of such configurations will form a
sequence (i.e., a history as defined in Section 3.3). As a result, when k configurations are
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Algorithm 6 DBLA: code for process p (client, part II)
1: procedure Refine(vs)
2: acks1 ← ∅; acks2 ← ∅
3: curVals ← curVals ∪ vs
4: seqNum ← seqNum + 1
5: status ← proposing
6: let C = HighestConf(history)
7: send 〈Propose, curVals, seqNum, C〉 to replicas(C)
8: upon ContainsQuorum(acks1,HighestConf(history))
9: status ← confirming
10: let C = HighestConf(history)
11: send 〈Confirm, acks1, seqNum, C〉 to replicas(C)
12: upon receive 〈ProposeResp, vs, sig, sn〉 from replica r
13: let sigValid = FSVerify(〈ProposeResp, vs〉, r, sig,Height(HighestConf(history)))
14: if status = proposing ∧ sn = seqNum ∧ sigValid then
15: if vs * curVals ∧VerifyInputValues(vs \ curVals) then Refine(vs)
16: else if vs = curVals then acks1 ← acks1 ∪ {〈r, sig〉}
17: upon receive 〈ConfirmResp, sig, sn〉 from replica r
18: let sigValid = FSVerify(〈ConfirmResp, acks1〉, r, sig,Height(HighestConf(history)))
19: if status = confirming ∧ sn = seqNum ∧ sigValid then
20: acks2 ← acks2 ∪ {〈r, sig〉}
21: upon RB-deliver 〈NewHistory, h, σ〉 from any sender
22: if VerifyHistory(h, σ) ∧ history ⊂ h then
23: history ← h; σhistory ← σ
24: trigger up-call NewHistory(h)
25: if status ∈ {proposing, confirming} then Refine(∅)
concurrently proposed, only O(k) configurations are accessed for state transfer, and not an
exponential number as in some earlier work on reconfiguration [2, 18]. This is known to be
optimal [32].
B.2 Proof of correctness
DBLA safety
Recall that a configuration is called candidate iff it appears in the local history of a correct
process. The following lemma gathers some obvious yet extremely useful statements about
candidate configurations.
I Lemma 1 (Candidate configurations).
1. Each candidate configuration is present in some verifiable history.
2. There is a finite number of candidate configurations.
3. All candidate configurations are comparable with “v”.
Proof. Only a verifiable history can be adopted by a correct process (Algorithm 6, line 22
and Algorithm 8, line 2), hence (1). The total number of verifiable histories is required to be
finite, and each history is finite, hence (2). All verifiable histories are required to be related
by containment and all configurations within one history are required to be comparable,
hence (3). J
A configuration is called pivotal if it is the last configuration in some verifiable history.
Non-pivotal candidate configurations are called tentative.
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Algorithm 7 DBLA: code for process p (replica, part I)
Parameters: C, L, Cinit , Vinit , VerifyHistory(h, σ), and VerifyInputValue(v, σ) (see Algorithm 5)
Global variables:
1: history ⊆ C, initially {Cinit} . local history of this process
2: curVals ⊆ L× Σ, initially {〈Vinit ,⊥〉} . known valid input values with proofs
3: Ccurr ∈ C, initially Cinit . current configuration
4: Cinst ∈ C, initially Cinit . installed configuration
5: seqNum ∈ Z, initially 0 . used to match requests with responses
Auxiliary functions:
6: HighestConf, ContainsQuorum, JoinAll, Height, VerifyInputValues (see Algorithm 5).
7: FSSign(message, timestamp) . produces a forward-secure signature (see Section 2)
8: UpdateFSKeys(t) . updates the signing timestamp (see Section 2)
9: upon receive 〈Propose, vs, sn, C〉 from client c
10: wait for C = Cinst ∨ C @ HighestConf(history)
11: if C = HighestConf(history) ∧VerifyInputValues(vs \ curVals) then
12: curVals ← curVals ∪ vs
13: let sig = FSSign(〈ProposeResp, curVals〉,Height(C))
14: send 〈ProposeResp, curVals, sig, sn〉 to c
15: upon receive 〈Confirm, proposeAcks, sn, C〉 from client c
16: wait for C ∈ history
17: if C = HighestConf(history) then
18: let sig = FSSign(〈ConfirmResp, proposeAcks〉,Height(C))
19: send 〈ConfirmResp, sig, sn〉 to c
. State transfer
20: upon Ccurr 6= HighestConf({C ∈ history | p ∈ replicas(C)})
21: let Cnext = HighestConf({C ∈ history | p ∈ replicas(C)})
22: let S = {C ∈ history | Ccurr v C @ Cnext}
23: seqNum ← seqNum + 1
24: for each C ∈ S do
25: send 〈UpdateRead, seqNum, C〉 to replicas(C)
26: wait for (C @ Ccurr ) ∨ (responses from any Q ∈ quorums(C) with s.n. seqNum)
27: if Ccurr @ Cnext then
28: Ccurr ← Cnext
29: URB-Broadcast 〈UpdateComplete〉 in Cnext
Algorithm 8 DBLA: code for process p (replica, part II)
1: upon RB-deliver 〈NewHistory, h, σ〉 from any sender
2: if VerifyHistory(h, σ) ∧ history ⊂ h then
3: history ← h
4: trigger up-call NewHistory(h)
5: UpdateFSKeys(Height(HighestConf(history)))
6: upon receive 〈UpdateRead, sn, C〉 from replica r
7: wait for C @ HighestConf(history) . only reply after UpdateFSKeys
8: send 〈UpdateReadResp, curVals, sn〉 to r
9: upon receive 〈UpdateReadResp, vs, sn〉 from replica r
10: if VerifyInputValues(vs \ curVals) then curVals ← curVals ∪ vs
11: upon URB-deliver 〈UpdateComplete〉 in C from quorum Q ∈ quorums(C)
12: wait for C ∈ history
13: if Cinst @ C then
14: if Ccurr @ C then Ccurr ← C
15: Cinst ← C
16: trigger up-call InstalledConfig(C)
17: if p ∈ replicas(Ccurr ) ∧ p /∈ replicas(C) then halt
Asynchronous Reconfiguration with Byzantine Failures XX:23
Intuitively, the next lemma states that in the rest of the proofs we can almost always
consider only pivotal configurations. Tentative configurations are both harmless and useless.
I Lemma 2 (Tentative configurations).
1. No correct client will ever make a request to a tentative configuration.
2. Tentative configurations cannot be installed.
3. A correct process will never invoke FSVerify with timestamp Height(C) for any tentative
configuration C.
4. A correct replica will never broadcast any message via the uniform reliable broadcast
primitive in a tentative configuration.
Proof. Follows directly from the algorithm. Both clients and replicas only operate on
configurations that were obtained by invoking the function HighestConf(h) on some verifiable
configuration. J
The next lemma states that correct processes cannot “miss” any pivotal configurations in
their local histories. This is crucial for the correctness of the state transfer protocol.
I Lemma 3. If C v HighestConf(h), where C is a pivotal configuration and h is the local
history of a correct process, then C ∈ h.
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of a pivotal configuration and the requirement
that all verifiable histories are related by containment (see Section 3.4). J
Recall that a configuration is called superseded iff some higher configuration is installed
(see Section 3.3). A configuration is installed iff some correct replica has triggered the
InstalledConfig up-call (Algorithm 8, line 16). For this, the correct replica must receive
a quorum of UpdateComplete messages via the uniform reliable broadcast primitive
(Algorithm 8, line 11).
I Theorem 4 (Installation Validity). Our implementation of DBLA satisfies Installation
Validity. I.e., only a candidate configuration can be installed.
Proof. Follows directly from the implementation. A correct replica will not install a configu-
ration until it is in the replica’s local history (Algorithm 8, line 12). J
In our algorithm it is possible for a configuration to be installed after it was superseded.
There are at least three scenarios how it might happen:
1. If a quorum of replicas broadcast UpdateComplete messages in some configuration C
which is not yet installed, then a higher configuration is installed making C superseded,
then some correct replica in C deliver the broadcast messages and triggers the up-call
(Algorithm 8, line 16).
2. If C is superseded, but there is one “slow” replica that doesn’t yet know about it. The
other replicas might turn Byzantine and broadcast the UpdateComplete messages in
C. Since an UpdateComplete message doesn’t include any additional information such
as digital signatures, the correct replica has no way to tell that these messages are from
Byzantine replicas and will trigger the up-call (Algorithm 8, line 16).
We could technically prevent the second scenario, but not the first one. Moreover, some
“intermidiate” scenarios are also inevitable. Let us call the configurations that were installed
while being active (i.e., not superseded) “properly installed”. We will use this definition to
prove next few lemmas.
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I Lemma 5. The lowest properly installed configuration higher than configuration C is the
first installed configuration higher than C in time order.
Proof. Let N be the lowest properly installed configuration higher than C. If some configu-
ration higher than N were installed earlier, then N would not be properly installed. If some
configuration between C and N were installed earlier, then N would not be the lowest. J
The following lemma stipulates that our state transfer protocol makes the superseded
pivotal configurations “harmless” by leveraging a forward-secure signature scheme.
I Lemma 6 (Key update). If a pivotal configuration C is superseded, then there is no quorum
of replicas in that configuration capable of signing messages with timestamp Height(C), i.e.,
@Q ∈ quorums(C) s.t. ∀r ∈ Q : str ≤ Height(C).
Proof. Let N be the lowest properly installed configuration higher than C. Let us consider
the moment when N was installed. By the algorithm, all corect replicas in some quorum
QN ∈ quorums(N) had to broadcast UpdateComplete messages before N was installed
(Algorithm 8, line 11). Since N was not yet superseded at that moment, there was at least
one correct replica rN ∈ QN .
By Lemma 3, C was in rN ’s local history whenever it performed state transfer to any
configuration higher than C. By the protocol, a correct replica only advances its Ccurr
variable after executing the state transfer protocol (Algorithm 7, line 28) or right before
installing a configuration (Algorithm 8, line 14). Since no configurations between C and N
were yet installed, rN had to pass through C in its state transfer protocol and to receive
UpdateReadResp messages from some quorum QC ∈ quorums(C) (Algorithm 7, line 26).
Recall that correct replicas update their private keys whenever they learn about a
higher configuration (Algorithm 8, line 5) and that they will only reply to message
〈UpdateRead, sn, C〉 once C is not the highest configuration in their local histories (Al-
gorithm 8, line 7). This means that all correct replicas in QC actually had to update their
private keys before N was installed, and, hence, before C was superseded. By the quorum
intersection property, this means that in each quorum in C at least one replica updated
its private key to a timestamp higher than Height(C) and will not be capable of signing
messages with timestamp Height(C) even if it becomes Byzantine. J
Notice that in a tentative configuration there might be arbitrary many Byzantine replicas
with their private keys not updated. This is inevitable in asynchronous system: forcing
the replicas in tentative configurations to update their private keys would require solving
consensus. This doesn’t affect correct processes because, as shown in Lemma 2, tentative
configurations are harmless. However, it is important to remember when designing new
dynamic protocols.
The following lemma formalizes that the state is correctly transfered between configura-
tions.
I Lemma 7 (State transfer correctness).
If σ = 〈vs, h, σh, proposeAcks, confirmAcks〉 is a valid proof for v, then for each active installed
configuration D such that HighestConf(h) @ D, there is a quorum QD ∈ quorums(D) such
that for each correct replica in QD: vs ⊆ curVals.
Proof. Let C = HighestConf(h). We proceed by induction on the sequence of all properly
installed configurations higher than C. Let us denote this sequence by C˜. Other configu-
rations are not interesting simply because there is no such moment in time when they are
simultaneously active and installed.
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Let N be lowest configuration in C˜. Let QC ∈ quorums(C) be a quorum of replicas whose
signatures are in proposeAcks. Since N is installed, there is a quorum QN ∈ quorums(N)
in which all correct replicas broadcast 〈UpdateComplete, N〉. For each correct replica
rN ∈ QN , rN passed with its state transfer protocol through configuration C and received
UpdateReadResp messages from some quorum of replicas in C. Note that at that moment
N wasn’t yet installed, and, hence C wasn’t yet superseded. By the quorum intersection
property, there is at least one correct replica rC ∈ QC that sent an UpdateReadResp
message to rN (Algorithm 8, line 8). Because rC will only react to rN ’s message after updating
its private keys (Algorithm 8, line 7), it had to sign 〈ProposeResp, vs〉 (Algorithm 7, line 13)
before sending reply to rN , which means that the UpdateReadResp message from rC to
rN must have contained a set of values that includes all values from vs. This proves the base
case of the induction.
Let us consider any configuration D ∈ C˜ such that N @ D. Let M be the highest
configuration in C˜ such that N vM @ D (in other words, the closest to D in C˜). Assume that
the statement holds for M , i.e., while M was active, there were a quorum QM ∈ quorums(M)
such that for each correct replica in QM : vs ⊆ curVals. Similarly to the base case, let
us consider a quorum QD ∈ quorums(D) such that every correct replica in QD reliably
broadcast 〈UpdateComplete, D〉 before D was installed. For each correct replica rD ∈ QD,
by the quorum intersection property, there is at least one correct replica in QM that sent an
UpdateReadResp message to rD. This replica attached its curVals to the message, which
contained vs. This proves the induction step and completes the proof. J
The next lemma states that if two output values were produced in the same configuration,
they are comparable. In a static system it could be proven by simply referring to the
quorum intersection property. In a dynamic Byzantine system, however, to use the quorum
intersection, we need to prove that the configuration was active during the whole period
when the clients were exchanging data with the replicas. We need to prove that the “slow
reader” attack is impossible. Luckily, we have the second stage of our algorithm designed for
this sole purpose.
I Lemma 8 (Comparability in one configuration).
If σ1 = 〈vs1, h1, σh1, proposeAcks1, confirmAcks1〉 is a valid proof for output value v1,
and σ2 = 〈vs2, h2, σh2, proposeAcks2, confirmAcks2〉 is a valid proof for output value v2,
and HighestConf(h1) = HighestConf(h2), then v1 and v2 are comparable.
Proof. Let C = HighestConf(h1) = HighestConf(h2). By definition, σ is a valid proof for v
means that VerifyOutputValue(v, σ) = true (Algorithm 5, line 25). By the implementation,
this means that h1 and h2 are verifiable histories (Algorithm 5, line 29). Therefore, C is a
pivotal configuration.
The set confirmAcks1 contains signatures from a quorum of replicas of configuration C,
with timestamp Height(C). Each of these signatures had to be produced after each of the
signatures in proposeAcks1 because they sign the message 〈ConfirmResp, proposeAcks1〉
(Algorithm 7, line 18). Combining this with the statement of Lemma 6 (Key Update), it
follows that at the moment when the last signature in the set proposeAcks1 was created, the
configuration C was active (otherwise it would be impossible to gather confirmAcks1). We
can apply the same argument to the sets proposeAcks2 and confirmAcks2.
It follows that there are quorums Q1, Q2 ∈ quorums(C) and a moment in time t
such that: (1) C is not superseded at time t, (2) all correct replicas in Q1 signed
message 〈ProposeResp, vs1〉 before t, and (3) all correct replica in Q2 signed message
〈ProposeResp, vs2〉 before t. Since C is not superseded at time t, there must be a
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correct replica in Q1 ∩ Q2 (by the Quorum Intersection property), which signed both
〈ProposeResp, vs1〉 and 〈ProposeResp, vs2〉 (Algorithm 7, line 13). Since correct replicas
only sign ProposeResp messages with comparable sets of values3, vs1 and vs2 are compa-
rable, i.e., either vs1 ⊆ vs2 or vs2 ⊂ vs1. Hence, v1 = JoinAll(vs1) and v2 = JoinAll(vs2) are
comparable. J
Finally, let us combine the two previous lemmas to prove the Comparability property of
our DBLA implementation.
I Theorem 9 (Comparability). Our implementation of DBLA satisfies the Comparability
property. That is, all verifiable output values are comparable.
Proof. Let σ1 = 〈vs1, h1, σh1, proposeAcks1, confirmAcks1〉 be a valid proof for output value
v1, and σ2 = 〈vs2, h2, σh2, proposeAcks2, confirmAcks2〉 be a valid proof for output value v2.
Also, let C1 = HighestConf(h1) and C2 = HighestConf(h2). Since h1 and h2 are verifiable
histories (Algorithm 5, line 29), both C1 and C2 are pivotal by definition.
If C1 = C2, v1 and v2 are comparable by Lemma 8.
Consider the case when C1 6= C2. Without loss of generality, assume that C1 @ C2.
Let Q1 ∈ quorums(C2) be a quorum of replicas whose signatures are in proposeAcks2. Let
t be the moment when first correct replica signed 〈ProposeResp, vs2〉. Correct replicas
only start processing user requests in a configuration when this configuration is installed
(Algorithm 7, line 10). Therefore, by Lemma 7, at time t there was a quorum of replicas
Q2 ∈ quorums(C2) such that for every correct replica in Q2: vs1 ⊆ curVals. By the quorum
intersection property, there must be at least one correct replica in Q1 ∩Q2. Hence, vs1 ⊆ vs2
and JoinAll(vs1) v JoinAll(vs2). J
I Theorem 10 (DBLA safety). Our implementation satisfies the safety properties of DBLA:
Validity, Verifiability, Inclusion, Comparability, Dynamic Validity, History Comparability,
and Installation Validity.
Proof.
Validity follows directly from the implementation: a correct client collects verifiable input
values and joins them before returning from Propose (Algorithm 5, line 22);
Verifiability follows directly from how correct replicas form and check the proofs for
output values (Algorithm 5, lines 21 and 27–32);
Inclusion follows from the fact that the set curVals of a correct client only grows (Algo-
rithm 6, line 3);
Comparability follows from Theorem 9;
Dynamic Validity follows from the fact that correct processes check that the history is
verifiable before adopting it (Algorithm 6, line 22 and Algorithm 8, line 2);
The History Comparability property has two statements in it. One of them follows the
requirement that verifiable histories are comparable. The other one follows from the fact
that correct processes check that history ⊂ h before adopting history h (Algorithm 6,
line 22 and Algorithm 8, line 2);
Finally, Installation Validity follows from Theorem 4.
J
3 Indeed, elements are only added to the set curVals of each correct replica, and the replicas only sign
messages with the same set of verifiable input values as curVals (see Algorithm 7, lines 12–13).
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DBLA liveness
I Theorem 11 (History Convergence). Local histories of all correct processes will eventually
become identical.
Proof. Let p and q be any two forever-correct processes4. Suppose, for contradiction, that
the local histories of p and q have diverged at some point and will never converge again.
Recall that correct processes only adopt verifiable histories, and that we require the total
number of verifiable histories to be finite. Therefore, there is some configuration hp, which is
the the highest configuration ever adopted by p, and some configuration hq which is the the
highest configuration ever adopted by q. Since all verifiable configurations are required to
be comparable, and we assume that hp 6= hq, one of them must be higher than the other.
Without loss of generality, suppose that hp ⊂ hq. Since q had to deliver hq through reliable
broadcast (unless hq is the initial history), and q remains correct forever, p will eventually
deliver hq as well, and will adopt it. A contradition. J
Next, we introduce an important definition, which we will use throughout the rest of the
proofs.
I Definition 12 (Maximal installed configuration). In a given infinite execution, a maximal
installed configuration is a configuration that eventually becomes installed and never becomes
superseded.
I Lemma 13 (Cmax existence). In any infinite execution there is a unique maximal installed
configuration.
Proof. By Lemma 1 (Candidate configurations) and Theorem 4 (Installation Validity), the
total number of installed configurations is finite and they are comparable. Hence, we can
choose a unique maximum among them, which is never superseded by definition. J
Let us denote the (unique) maximal installed configuration by Cmax .
I Lemma 14 (Cmax installation). The maximal installed configuration will eventually be
installed by all correct replicas.
Proof. Since Cmax is installed, by definition, at some point some correct replica has triggered
up-call InstalledConfig(Cmax) (Algorithm 8, line 16). This, in turn, means that this replica
delivered a quorum of UpdateComplete messages via the uniform reliable broadcast in
Cmax when it was correct. Therefore, even if this replica later becomes Byzantine, by
definition of the uniform reliable broadcast, either Cmax will become superseded (which is
impossible), or every correct replica will eventually deliver the same set ofUpdateComplete
messages and install Cmax . J
I Lemma 15 (State transfer progress). State transfer (Algorithm 7, lines 20–29), executed
by a forever-correct replica, always terminates.
Proof. Let r be a correct replica executing state transfer. By Lemma 1, the total number
of candidate configurations is finite. Therefore, it is enough to prove that there is no such
configuration that r will wait for replies from a quorum of that configuration indefinitely
(Algorithm 7, line 26). Suppose, for contradiction, that there is such configuration C.
4 If either p or q eventually halts or becomes Byzantine, their local histories are not required to converge.
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If C @ Cmax , then, by Lemma 14, r will eventually install Cmax , and Ccurr will become
not lower than Cmax (Algorithm 8, line 14). Hence, r will terminate from waiting through
the first condition (C @ Ccurr). A contradiction.
Otherwise, if Cmax v C, then, by the definition of Cmax , C will never be superseded.
Since r remains correct forever, by Theorem 11 (History Convergence), every correct replica
will eventually have C in its local history. Since we assume reliable links between proceses
(see Section 2), every correct replica in replicas(C) will eventually receive r’s UpdateRead
message and will send a reply, which r will receive (Algorithm 8, line 8). Hence, the waiting on
line 26 of Algorithm 7 will eventually terminate through the second condition (r will receive
responses from some Q ∈ quorums(C) with correct sequence number). A contradiction. J
Intuitively, the following lemma states that Cmax is, in some sense, the “final” configuration.
After some point every correct process will operate exclusively on Cmax . No correct process
will know about any configuration higher than Cmax or “care” about any configuration lower
than Cmax .
I Lemma 16. Cmax will eventually become the highest configuration in the local history of
each correct process.
Proof. By Theorem 11 (History Convergence), the local histories of all correct processes will
eventually converge to the same history h. Let D = HighestConf(h). Since Cmax is installed
and never superseded, it cannot be higher than D (at least one correct replica will always
“remember” about Cmax).
Suppose, for contradiction, that Cmax @ D. In this case, D is never superseded, which
means that there is a quorum QD ∈ quorums(D) that consists entirely of forever-correct
processes. By Theorem 11 (History Convergence), all replicas in QD will eventually learn
about D and will try to perform state transfer to it. By Lemma 15, they will eventually
succeed and install D. A contradiction with the definition of Cmax . J
I Theorem 17 (Installation Liveness). Our implementation of DBLA satisfies the Installation
Liveness property. That is, (1) if configuration C is in the local history of a forever-correct
process, either C or a higher configuration will eventually be installed; (2) if some configuration
C is installed, each correct replica will eventually install C or a higher configuration.
Proof. Statement (1) follows directly from Lemma 16 and the definition of Cmax . State-
ment (2) follows from Lemma 14 (Cmax installation). J
I Theorem 18 (Operational Liveness). Our implementation of DBLA satisfies the Operational
Liveness property: if the total number of verifiable input values is finite, every call to
Propose(v, σ) by a forever-correct process eventually terminates.
Proof. Let p be a forever-correct client that invoked Propose(v, σ). By Lemma 16, Cmax
will eventually become the highest configuration in the local history of p. If the client’s
request will not terminate by the time it learns about Cmax , the client will call Refine(∅)
after it (Algorithm 6, line 25). By Lemma 14, Cmax will eventually be installed by all correct
replicas. Since it will never be superseded, there will be a quorum of forever-correct replicas.
This means that every round of messages from the client will eventually be responded to by
a quorum of correct replicas.
Since the total number of valid input values is finite, the client will call Refine only a finite
number of times (Algorithm 6, line 15). After the last call to Refine, the client will inevitably
receive acknowledgements from a quorum of replicas, and will proceed to sending Confirm
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messages (Algorithm 6, line 11). Again, since there is an available quorum of correct replicas
that installed Cmax , the client will eventually receive enough acknowledgments and will
complete the operation (Algorithm 5, line 20). J
I Theorem 19 (DBLA liveness). Our implementation satisfies the liveness properties of
DBLA: Operational Liveness, Dynamic Liveness, History Convergence, and Installation
Liveness.
Proof.
Operational Liveness follows from Theorem 18;
Dynamic Liveness follows from the liveness of reliable broadcast: the client will eventually
receive its own history and will adopt it unless it already adopted a larger history
(Algorithm 6, line 25).
History Convergence follows from Theorem 11;
Finally, Installation Liveness follows from Theorem 17.
J
B.3 Possible optimizations
Here we would like to mention a few possible directions for optimization. Most of them are
dedicated to reducing the communication cost of the protocol.
First, the proofs in our protocol include the full local history of a process. Moreover,
this history comes with its own proof, which also usually contains a history, and so on. If
implemented naively, the size of one proof in bytes will be at least quadratic with respect to
the number of distinct candidate configurations, which is completely unnecessary. The first
observation is that these histories will be related by containment. So, in fact, they can be
compressed just to the size of the largest one, which is linear. But we can go further and say
that, in fact, in a practical implementation, the processes almost never should actually send
full histories to each other because every process maintains its local history and all histories
with proofs are already disseminated via the reliable broadcast primitive. When one process
wants to send some history to some other process, it can just send a cryptographic hash of
this history. The other process can check if it already has this history and, if not, ask the
sender to only send the missing parts, instead of the whole history.
Second, a naive implementation of our DBLA protocol would send ever-growing sets of
verifiable input values around, which is, just as with histories, completely unnecessary. The
processes should just limit themselves to sending diffs between what they know and what
they think the recipient knows.
Third, almost every proof in our systems contains signatures from a quorum of replicas.
This adds another linear factor to the communication cost. However, it can be significantly
reduced by the use of forward-secure multi-signatures, such as Pixel [14], which was designed
for similar purposes.
Finally, we use a suboptimal implementation of lattice agreement as the foundation
for our DBLA protocol. Perhaps, we could benefit from adapting a more efficient crash
fault-tolerant asynchronous solution [33].
C Reconfigurable objects: complete pseudocode and proofs
In Section 4.2 we present a general transformation from a dynamic object into a reconfigurable
one. Here we would like to clarify some assumptions, explain some motivation behind our
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implementation, provide the full pseudocode, describe some possible optimizations, and,
finally, prove the correctness of our transformation.
C.1 Implementation
Algorithm 9 Reconfigurable object: code for process p
. Common code
Parameters:
1: Lattice of configurations C and the initial configuration Cinit
2: Boolean function VerifyInputConfig(C, σ)
3: Dynamic object DObj, which we want to make reconfigurable
Shared objects:
4: ConfLA . DBLA on lattice C
5: HistLA . DBLA on lattice 2C
6: DObj . the dynamic object being transformed
Global variables:
7: history ⊆ C, initially {Cinit} . local history of this process
8: upon RB-deliver 〈NewHistory, h, σ〉 from any sender
9: if HistLA.VerifyOutputValue(h, σ) ∧ history ⊂ h then
10: history ← h
11: . Tell all three dynamic objects about the new history.
12: ConfLA.UpdateHistory(h, σ)
13: HistLA.UpdateHistory(h, σ)
14: DObj.UpdateHistory(h, σ)
15: trigger up-call NewHistory(h)
. Client’s code
16: Data operations are performed directly on DObj.
17: operation UpdateConfig(C, σ)
18: let 〈D,σD〉 = ConfLA.Propose(C, σ)
19: let 〈h, σh〉 = HistLA.Propose({D}, σD)
20: RB-Broadcast 〈NewHistory, h, σ〉
. Replica’s code
21: upon receive up-call InstalledConfig(C) from all DObj, HistLA, and DObj
22: trigger up-call InstalledConfig(C)
. Parameters specification
23: function ConfLA.VerifyInputValue(v, σ) = VerifyInputConfig(v, σ)
24: function HistLA.VerifyInputValue(v, σ)
25: if v is not a set of 1 element then return false
26: let {C} = v
27: return ConfLA.VerifyOutputValue(C, σ)
28: function VerifyHistory(h, σ) = HistLA.VerifyOutputValue(h, σ) . used by all dynamic objects
Cryptographic keys. In Algorithm 9, we use several dynamic objects. We assume that
correct replicas have separate public/private key pairs for each dynamic object. This prevents
replay attacks across objects and allows each dynamic object to manage its keys separately.
Bootstrapping. We know from prior work [22, 25] that lattice agreement is very useful for
reconfiguration. In particular, it can be used to build comparable configurations. We take a
step further and use two separate instances of lattice agreement: one to build comparable
configurations (ConfLA) and the other to build histories out of them (HistLA). We can then
use these two LA objects to reconfigure a single dynamic object.
However, this raises a question: how to reconfigure the lattice agreement objects them-
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selves? We found the answer in the idea that is sometimes referred to as “bootstrapping”.
We use the lattice agreement objects to reconfigure themselves and at least one other object.
This implies that the lattice agreement objects share the configurations with DObj. The
most natural implementation is that the code for all three dynamic objects will be executed
by the same set of replicas.
Bootstrapping is dangerous because, if applied badly, it can lead to infinite recursion.
However, we structured our solution in such a way that there is no recursion at all: the client
first makes normal requests to ConfLA and HistLA, and then uses the resulting history to
reconfigure all dynamic objects, as if this history was obtained by the client from the outside of
the system. It is important to notice that liveness of the call HistLA.VerifyOutputValue(h, σ)
is not affected by reconfiguration: the function simply checks some digital signatures and is
guaranteed to always terminate given enough processing time.
Shared parts. All implementations of dynamic objects presented in this paper have a
similar structure. For example, they all share the same code for state transfer (Algorithm 7,
lines 20–29). However, we do not deny the possibility that other implementations of other
dynamic objects might have very different implementations. Therefore, in our transformation
we use DObj as a “blackbox” and do not make any assumptions about its implementation.
Moreover, for simplicity, we use the two DBLA objects as “blackboxes” as well. In fact,
ConfLA and HistLA may have different implementations and the transformation will still
work as long as they satisfy the specification from Section 3. However, this comes at a cost.
In particular, if implemented naively, a single reconfigurable object will run several
independent state transfer protocols. If, as in our paper, all dynamic objects have similar
implementations of their state transfer protocols, this can be done more efficiently by
combining all state transfer protocols into one, which should transfer the states of all dynamic
objects and make sure that superseded configurations are harmless.
Another part shared by all dynamic objects presented here is the mechanism they use
to disseminate new histories (Algorithm 5, line 23), using the global reliable broadcast
primitive (Section 3.6). Moreover, we do the same on the “higher” level, in the pseudocode
for our transformation itself (Algorithm 9, line 20). This is necessary to guarantee that
if one dynamic object installs a configuration, then all other dynamic objects will do the
same eventually. Of course, there is no need to broadcast the same data multiple times and
practical implementations should avoid it when possible.
C.2 Proof of correctness
In the following two lemmas we show that we use the dynamic objects (ConfLA, HistLA,
and DObj) correctly, i.e., all requirements imposed on verifiable histories are satisfied.
I Lemma 20. All histories passed to the dynamic objects by correct processes (Algorithm 9,
lines 12–14) are verifiable with VerifyHistory (Algorithm 9, line 28).
Proof. Follows directly from the implementation (Algorithm 9, line 9). J
I Lemma 21. All histories verifiable with VerifyHistory (Algorithm 9, line 28) are (1) well-
formed (that is, consist of comparable configurations) and (2) related by containment. More-
over, (3) in any given infinite execution there is only a finite number of histories verifiable
with VerifyHistory.
Proof. (1) follows from the Comparability property of ConfLA, the Validity property of
HistLA, and the definition of HistLA.VerifyInputValue (Algorithm 9, line 24).
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(2) follows directly from the Comparability property of HistLA.
(3) follows from the requirement of finite number of verifiable input configurations and
the Validity property of ConfLA and HistLA. Only a finite number of configurations can be
formed by ConfLA out of a finite number of verifiable input configurations. Then, only a
finite number of histories can be formed by HistLA out of configurations from ConfLA. J
I Theorem 22 (Transformation safety). Our implementation satisfies the safety properties
of a reconfigurable object: Reconfiguration Validity, History Comparability, and Installation
Validity.
Proof.
Reconfiguration Validity follows from the Comparability property of ConfLA, the Va-
lidity property of ConfLA and HistLA, and the definition of HistLA.VerifyInputValue
(Algorithm 9, line 24);
History Comparability follows from the Comparability property of HistLA;
Finally, Installation Validity follows from the Installation Validity of the underlying
dynamic objects.
J
I Theorem 23 (History Convergence). Local histories of all correct processes will eventually
become identical.
Proof. The same reasoning as for Theorem 11 (History Convergence theorem for DBLA)
can be applied with the only modification that instead of “verifiable histories” we need to
consider “histories verifiable with VerifyHistory” (see Lemma 21). J
I Theorem 24 (Transformation liveness). Our implementation satisfies the liveness properties
of a reconfigurable object: Reconfiguration Liveness, History Convergence, and Installation
Liveness.
Proof.
Reconfiguration Liveness follows from the Operational Liveness property of ConfLA and
HistLA and the liveness of reliable broadcast.
History Convergence follows from Theorem 23;
Finally, Installation Liveness follows from the Installation Liveness of the underlying
dynamic objects.
J
D Max Register
To examplify our claim that our approach to building dynamic objects can be used to
implement different abstractions and is not limited to lattice agreement, in this section we
show how to create an atomic Byzantine fault tolerant Max-Register in dynamic setting.
An atomic (a.k.a. linearizable) multi-writer multi-reader Byzantine Max-Register is a
distributed object that has two operations: Read() and Write(v, σ) and must be parametrized
by a boolean function VerifyInputValue(v, σ). As before, we say that σ is a valid certificate
for input value v iff VerifyInputValue(v, σ) = true and that value v is a verifiable input
value iff some process knows σ such that VerifyInputValue(v, σ) = true. We assume that
correct clients invoke Write(v, σ) only if VerifyInputValue(v, σ) = true. We do not make
any assumptions on the number of verifiable input values for this abstraction (i.e. it can be
infinite).
The object must satisfy the following three properties:
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MR-Validity: if Read() returns value v to a correct process, then v is verifiable input
value;
MR-Atomicity: if some correct process p completed Write(v, σ) or received v from Read()
strictly before than some correct process q invoked Read(), then the value returned to q
must be greater than or equal to v;
MR-Liveness: every call to Read() and Write(v, σ) by a forever-correct process eventually
terminates.
For simplicity, unlike Byzantine Lattice Agreement, our Max-Register doesn’t provide the
VerifyOutputValue(v, σ) function.
D.1 Dynamic Max-Register implementation
Algorithm 10 Dynamic Max-Register: code for process p (client)
Parameters:
1: Lattice of configurations C and the initial configuration Cinit
2: The set of value V and the initial value Vinit
3: Boolean functions VerifyHistory(h, σ) and VerifyInputValue(v, σ)
Global variables:
4: history ⊆ C, initially {Cinit} . local history of this process
5: seqNum ∈ Z, initially 0 . used to match requests with responses
Auxiliary functions: HighestConf(h), FSVerify (see Section 2)
6: operation Read()
7: repeat
8: let 〈readOk, 〈v, σ〉〉 = Get()
9: let success = if readOk then Set(v, σ) else false
10: until success
11: return v
12: operation Write(v, σ)
13: repeat let success = Set(v, σ)
14: until success
15: operation UpdateHistory(h, σ)
16: RB-Broadcast 〈NewHistory, h, σ〉
17: procedure Set(v, σ)
18: seqNum ← seqNum + 1
19: let C = HighestConf(history)
20: send 〈Set, v, seqNum, C〉 to replicas(C)
21: wait for (HighestConf(history) 6= C) ∨ (replies from Q ∈ quorums(C) with valid signatures)
22: return HighestConf(history) 6= C
23: procedure Get()
24: seqNum ← seqNum + 1
25: let C = HighestConf(history)
26: send 〈Get, seqNum, C〉 to replicas(C)
27: wait for (HighestConf(history) 6= C) ∨ (replies from Q ∈ quorums(C))
28: if HighestConf(history) 6= C then return 〈false,⊥〉
29: else return 〈true,maximal verifiable input value among received〉
30: upon RB-deliver 〈NewHistory, h, σ〉 from any sender
31: if VerifyHistory(h, σ) ∧ history ⊂ h then history ← h
In this section we present our implementation of the dynamic version of the Max-Register
abstraction (Dynamic Max-Register or DMR for short). Overall, the “application” part of
the implementation is very similar to the classical ABD algorithm [6], and the “dynamic”
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Algorithm 11 Dynamic Max-Register: code for process p (replica)
Parameters: C, Cinit , V, Vinit , VerifyHistory(h, σ), and VerifyInputValue(v, σ) (See Algorithm 10)
Global variables:
1: history ⊆ C, initially {Cinit} . local history of this process
2: vcurr ∈ V, initially Vinit
3: σcurr ∈ Σ, initially σinit
4: Ccurr ∈ C, initially Cinit . current configuration
5: Cinst ∈ C, initially Cinit . installed configuration
Auxiliary functions: HighestConf(h), FSSign(m, t), UpdateFSKeys(t) (see Section 2)
6: upon receive 〈Get, sn, C〉 from client c
7: wait for C = Cinst ∨ C @ HighestConf(history)
8: if C = HighestConf(history) then send 〈GetResp, vcurr, σcurr, sn〉 to c
9: upon receive 〈Set, v, σ, sn, C〉 from client c
10: wait for C = Cinst ∨ C @ HighestConf(history)
11: if C = HighestConf(history) ∧VerifyInputValue(v, σ) then
12: if v > vcurr then 〈vcurr, σcurr〉 ← 〈v, σ〉
13: send 〈SetResp, FSSign(〈c, sn〉,Height(C)), sn〉 to c
. State transfer
14: upon Ccurr 6= HighestConf({C ∈ history | p ∈ replicas(C)})
15: Same as for DBLA (Algorithm 2, lines 7–16)
16: upon receive 〈UpdateRead, C, sn〉 from replica r
17: wait for C @ HighestConf(history) . only reply after UpdateFSKeys
18: send 〈UpdateReadResp, vcurr, σcurr, sn〉 to r
19: upon receive 〈UpdateReadResp, v, σ, sn〉 from replica r
20: if VerifyInputValue(v, σ) ∧ v > vcurr then 〈vcurr, σcurr〉 ← 〈v, σ〉
21: upon RB-deliver 〈NewHistory, h, σ〉 from any sender
22: Same as for DBLA (Algorithm 2, lines 17–21)
23: upon RB-deliver 〈UpdateComplete, C〉 from replica r
24: Same as for DBLA (Algorithm 2, lines 22–28)
part of the implementation is almost the same as in DBLA.
Client implementation
From the client’s perspective, the two main procedures are Get() and Set(v, σ). Set(v, σ)
(Algorithm 10, lines 17–22) is used to store the value on a quorum of replicas of the most
recent configuration. It returns true iff it manages to receive signed acknowledgments from a
quorum of some configuration. Forward secure signatures are used to prevent the “I still
work here” attack. Since Set doesn’t try to read any information from the replicas, it is not
susceptible to the “slow reader” attack. Get() (lines 23–29) is very similar to Set(...) and
is used to request information from a quorum of repicas of the most recent configuration.
Since we do not provide the VerifyOutputValue(...) function, the replies from replicas are
not signed (Algorithm 11, line 8). Therefore, Get() is susceptible to both the “I still work
here” and the “slow reader” attack when used alone. Later in this section we discuss how the
invocation of Set(...) right after Get() (Algorithm 10, line 9) allows us to avoid these issues.
Operation Write(v, σ) (lines 12–14) is used by correct clients to store values in the register.
It simply performs repeated calls to Set(v, σ) until some call succeeds to reach a quorum of
replicas. Retries are safe because, as in lattice agreement, write requests to a max-register
are idempotent. Since we assume the total number of verifiable histories to be finite, only a
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finite number of retries is possible.
Operation Read() (lines 6–11) is used to request the current value from the register, and
it consists of repeated calls to both Get() and Set(...). The call to Get() is simply used to
query information from the replicas. The call to Set(...) is usually called “the write-back
phase” and serves two purposes here:
It is used instead of the “confirming” phase to prevent the “I still work here” and the
“slow-reader” attacks. Indeed, if the configuration was superseded during the execution of
Get(), Set(...) will not succed because it will not be able to gather a quorum of signed
replies in the same configuration;
Also, it is used to order the calls to Read() and to guarantee the MR-Atomicity of the
Max-Register [6]. Intuitively, if some correct process succesfully completed Set(v, σ)
strictly before some other correct process invoked Read(), the later process will receive a
value that is not smaller than v.
Replica implementation
The replica implementation (Algorithm 11) is mostly the same as for DBLA (Algorithm 2). It
handles the UpdateRead and UpdateReadResp messages a bit differently (Algorithm 11,
lines 16–20), by exchanging vcurr and σcurr instead of curVals as in DBLA. It also handles
client requests specific to Max-Register (Algorithm 11, lines 6–13).
D.2 Proof of correctness
Since our Dynamic Max-Register implementation uses the same state transfer protocol as
DBLA, most proofs from Section B.2 that apply to DBLA, also apply to DMR (with some
minor adaptations). Here we provide only the statements of such theorems, without repeating
the proofs. Then we introduce several theorems specific to DMR and sketch the proofs.
DMR safety
I Lemma 25 (Candidate configurations).
1. Each candidate configuration is present in some verifiable history.
2. There is a finite number of candidate configurations.
3. All candidate configurations are comparable with “v”.
I Lemma 26 (Tentative configurations).
1. No correct client will ever make a request to a tentative configuration.
2. Tentative configurations cannot be installed.
3. A correct process will never invoke FSVerify with timestamp Height(C) for any tentative
configuration C.
4. A correct replica will never broadcast any message via the uniform reliable broadcast
primitive in a tentative configuration.
I Lemma 27. If C v HighestConf(h), where C is a pivotal configuration and h is the local
history of a correct process, then C ∈ h.
I Theorem 28 (Installation Validity). Our implementation of DMR satisfies Installation
Validity. I.e., only a candidate configuration can be installed.
I Lemma 29 (Key update). If a pivotal configuration C is superseded, then there is no quorum
of replicas in that configuration capable of signing messages with timestamp Height(C), i.e.,
@Q ∈ quorums(C) s.t. ∀r ∈ Q : str ≤ Height(C).
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We say that a correct client completes its operation in configuration C iff at the moment
when the client completes its operation, the highest configuration in its local history is C.
I Lemma 30 (State transfer correctness).
If some correct process completed Write(v, σ) in C or received v from Read() operation
completed in C, then for each active installed configuration D such that C @ D, there is a
quorum QD ∈ quorums(D) such that for each correct replica in QD: vcurr ≥ v.
The following lemma is the first lemma specific to DMR.
I Lemma 31 (MR-Atomicity in one configuration).
If some correct process p completed Write(v, σ) in C or received v from Read() operation
completed in C, strictly before some process q invoked Read(), and q completed its operation
in C, then the value returned to q is greater than or equal to v.
Proof. Recall that Read() operation consists of repeated calls to two procedures: Get()
and Set(...). If process q successfully completed Set(...) in configuration C, then, by the
use of forward-secure signatures, configuration C was active during the execution of Get()
that preceded the call to Set. This also means that configuration C was active during the
execution of Set(v, σ) by process p, since it was before process q started executing its request.
By the quorum intersection property, process q must have received v or a greater value from
at least one correct replica. J
I Theorem 32 (MR-Atomicity). Our implementation of DMR satisfies the MR-Atomicity
property. If some correct process p completed Write(v, σ) or received v from Read() strictly
before than some process q invoked Read(), then the value returned to q must be greater than
or equal to v
Proof. Let C (resp., D) be the highest configuration in p’s (resp., q’s) local history when it
completed its request. Also, let v (resp., u) be the value that p (resp., q) passed to the last
call to Set(...) (notice that both Read() and Write(...) call Set(...)).
If C = D, then u ≥ v by Lemma 31.
The case when D @ C is impossible due to the use of forward-secure signatures Correct
replicas do not answer user requests in a configuration until this configuration is installed
(Algorithm 11, line 7). Therefore, C had to be installed before p completed its request. By
Lemma 29 (Key Update) and by the use of forward-secure signatures in Set(...), this would
mean that q would not be able to complete its request in D.
Finally, let us consider the case when C @ D. In this case, by Lemma 30, the quorum
intersection property, and the use of forward-secure signatures in Set(...), q received v or a
greater value from at least one correct replica during the execution of Get(). Therefore, in
this case u is also greater than or equal to v. J
I Theorem 33 (DMR safety). Our implementation satisfies the safety properties of DMR:
MR-Validity, MR-Atomicity, Dynamic Validity, History Comparability, and Installation
Validity.
Proof.
Validity follows directly from the implementation: correct clients only return verifiable
input values from Get() (Algorithm 10, line 29);
MR-Atomicity follows directly from Theorem 32.
Proofs for Dynamic Validity, History Comparability, and Installation Validity are exactly
the same as for DBLA (see Theorem 10).
J
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DMR liveness
I Theorem 34 (History Convergence). Local histories of all correct processes will eventually
become identical.
Recall that the maximal installed configuration is the highest installed configuration and
is denoted by Cmax (see Definition 12 and Lemma 13.
I Lemma 35 (Cmax installation). The maximal installed configuration will eventually be
installed by all correct replicas.
I Lemma 36 (State transfer progress). State transfer executed by a forever-correct replica,
always terminates.
I Lemma 37. Cmax will eventually become the highest configuration in the local history of
each correct process.
I Theorem 38 (Installation Liveness). Our implementation of DMR satisfies the Installation
Liveness property. That is, (1) if configuration C is in the local history of a forever-correct
process, either C or a higher configuration will eventually be installed; (2) if some configuration
C is installed, each correct replica will eventually install C or a higher configuration.
I Theorem 39 (MR-Liveness). Our implementation of DMR satisfies the MR-Liveness prop-
erty: every call to Read() and Write(v, σ) by a forever-correct process eventually terminates.
Proof. Let p be a forever-correct client that invoked Read() or Write(...). By Lemma 16,
Cmax will eventually become the highest configuration in the local history of p. If the client’s
request will not terminate by the time it learns about Cmax , the client will restart its request
there. Since Cmax will eventually be installed by all correct replicas and will never be
superseded, there will be a quorum of forever-correct replicas, and p will be able to complete
its request there. J
I Theorem 40 (DMR liveness). Our implementation satisfies the liveness properties of DMR:
MR-Liveness, Dynamic Liveness, History Convergence, and Installation Liveness.
Proof. MR-Liveness follows directly from Theorem 39. Proofs for Dynamic Liveness, History
Convergence, and Installation Liveness are exactly the same as for DBLA (see Theorem 10).
J
